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The	internal	contradictions	of	the	Brexit	project	are
unbridgeable
In	his	recent	testimony	to	the	House	of	Lords,	Sir	Ivan	Rogers	criticised	as	premature	and	ill-
prepared	the	Prime	Minister’s	triggering	last	March	of	Article	50.	Brendan	Donnelly	argues	that	this
is	unfair	to	Theresa	May.	No	different	date	for	the	beginning	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	could	or
would	have	rendered	them	any	less	painful	for	the	British	participants.	And	no	amount	of	extra
preparation	on	the	British	side	could	or	would	have	resolved	the	numerous	internal	contradictions	of
the	Brexit	project.
The	inability	of	David	Davis	and	his	colleagues	to	make	the	hoped-for	progress	in	the	Article	50	discussions	does
not	stem	from	Theresa	May’s	tactical	ineptitude	or	clumsy	negotiating	tactics.	It	stems	rather	from	the	traumatic
confrontation	between	the	collective	fantasy	of	the	Conservative	government	which	is	Brexit,	and	the	economic
and	political	realities	represented	by	Michel	Barnier.	It	is	still	an	open	question	what	the	precise	outcome	of	this
confrontation	will	be	for	the	Conservative	government.	But	it	was	a	confrontation	that	could	never	have	been
avoided	by	juggling	with	dates	or	more	intensive	preparatory	discussions.
It	is	not	always	realised	in	this	country,	even	by	eminent	commentators,	just	how	different	are	the	starting-points
in	the	Article	50	negotiations	between	the	British	government	and	the	EU.	The	British	side	has	a	single	aim,	that
of	maintaining	as	far	as	possible	what	it	sees	as	the	advantages	of	being	in	the	EU	while	minimising	what	it	sees
as	the	disadvantages.
The	EU	has	two	aims,	neither	of	which	sits	easily	with	British	aspirations.	The	first	is	to	ward	off	harm	to	itself
arising	directly	from	the	UK	exit,	be	it	in	Ireland,	in	the	Union’s	internal	finances	or	in	the	rights	of	EU	citizens.	The
second	aim,	once	this	harm	has	been	averted,	is	to	establish	a	long-term	economic	relationship	with	the	UK
which	is	mutually	beneficial,	but	which	appropriately	and	demonstrably	reflects	the	negative	consequences	of
British	unwillingness	to	accept	the	responsibilities	of	EU	membership.	It	is	a	familiar	mantra	of	British	ministers
that	both	the	UK	and	the	EU	have	an	interest	in	coming	to	an	agreement	for	an	orderly	British	withdrawal.	The
often	unacknowledged	problem	with	this	formulation	is	that	the	two	sides	define	their	interests	in	these	talks	in
such	radically	different	and	probably	incompatible	ways.
European	leaders	do	not	consider	it	as	part	of	their	job	to	save	the	foolish	British
from	the	consequences	of	their	folly
Even	Sir	Ivor	appears	from	his	testimony	to	peers	not	fully	to	have	grasped	this	chasm	of	differing	perceptions.
He	chides	May	for	not	having	approached	other	European	leaders	before	triggering	Article	50,	seeking
assurances	that	its	operation	would	not	disadvantage	the	UK.	May	was	well-advised	not	to	waste	her	breath	on
such	futile	petitions.	Most	other	European	leaders	do	not	wish	to	punish	the	UK	for	its	decision	to	leave	the	EU.
But	they	certainly	do	not	consider	it	as	part	of	their	job	to	save	the	foolish	British	from	the	consequences	of	their
folly.
Even	less	are	they	prepared	to	reward	the	seceding	British	by	allocating	them	a	more	favourable	set	of	economic
rights	and	responsibilities	than	that	they	currently	enjoy	as	members.	To	do	so	would	be	to	undermine	the
economic	and	political	foundations	on	which	the	Union	stands.	These	foundations	are	of	course	a	matter	of
indifference,	even	of	contempt	to	Davis	and	his	colleagues.	They	should	not	assume	that	the	same	is	true	of	their
European	negotiating	partners.	British	diplomats	sometimes	like	to	claim	that	they	are	unusually	skilled	at	putting
themselves	in	the	position	of	those	with	whom	they	are	negotiating.	That	anyway	doubtful	claim	is	certainly	not
borne	out	by	the	Brexit	negotiations.
It	is	entirely	possible	that	the	European	Council	in	mid-December	will	conclude	again	that	insufficient	progress
has	been	made	towards	realising	the	first	of	the	Union’s	goals	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.	Despite	the	apparent
commitment	of	the	Prime	Minister,	Jean-Claude	Juncker	and	Michel	Barnier	to	“accelerate”	the	pace	of
negotiation,	the	discussions	seem	to	have	once	more	entered	a	period	of	stagnation.
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From	the	British	side,	this	stagnation	is	blamed	on	the	EU	and	its	failure	to	make	reciprocal	“concessions”	to
those	offered	in	May’s	Florence	speech.	The	Union	does	not	believe	that	her	speech	calls	for	any	reaction	from
them	beyond	welcoming	it	as	a	belated	and	only	partial	recognition	of	British	obligations	to	it.	It	seems	highly
unlikely	that	May	will	be	permitted	by	her	party	in	the	coming	weeks	to	go	beyond	the	tentative	formulations	of	her
Florence	speech.	They	almost	certainly	represented	the	outer	limit	of	what	the	radical	Eurosceptic	wing	of	her
parliamentary	party	will	ever	accept.	This	wing	probably	does	not	have	a	numerical	majority	among	Conservative
MPs.	May	knows,	however,	that	she	will	not	continue	to	occupy	10	Downing	Street	very	long	without	at	least	this
wing’s	acquiescence	and	ideally	its	support.
May’s	supporters	supposedly	drew	some	comfort	from	the	decision	of	the	European	Council	in	October	to	begin
preliminary	internal	discussion	on	a	possible	long-term	trade	agreement	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	Whether
this	comfort	is	well-founded	must	be	more	than	doubtful.	If	by	the	time	of	the	next	summit	the	outlines	have
emerged	of	a	new	proposed	relationship	between	the	two	parties,	it	is	extremely	unlikely	to	be	one	attractive	to
the	current	British	government.
Barnier’s	remark	that	the	UK	would	not	be	allowed	after	Brexit	to	combine	the	rights	of	Norway	under	the	EEA
agreement	with	the	obligations	of	Canada	under	its	free	trade	agreement	was	probably	intended	as	a	statement
of	the	blindingly	obvious.	It	could	not,	however,	be	clearer	as	a	rejection	of	precisely	the	goals	of	the	British
government.	The	hope	and	indeed	expectation	of	many	in	the	British	government	and	elsewhere	that	a	special,
uniquely	favourable	(bespoke)	“deal”	will	be	on	offer	post-Brexit	is	the	purest	fantasy.
If	there	is	a	finally	negotiated	arrangement,	it	will	faithfully	reflect	the	template	already	established	by	the	Union	in
its	dealings	with	other	third	parties.	The	more	the	third	party	is	prepared	to	accept	the	responsibilities	of	Union
membership,	the	greater	will	be	its	access	to	the	rights	of	membership.	Yet	May	has	made	clear	that	her
government	rejects	the	responsibilities	of	membership	of	the	Customs	Union	and	membership	of	the	single
market.
If,	as	seems	entirely	possible,	the	European	Council	of	mid-December	refuses	to	move	onto	the	second	phase	of
negotiations,	while	at	the	same	time	sketching	out	the	limitations	on	what	it	might	anyway	be	prepared	to	offer	in
this	second	phase,	much	will	change	in	the	domestic	British	debate	around	Brexit.	The	two	alternatives	described
long	ago	by	Donald	Tusk,	of	a	“hard	Brexit”	or	“no	Brexit”	will	be	brought	more	sharply	into	focus,	with	perhaps
differing	consequences	for	two	crucial	audiences,	namely	for	the	Conservative	Party	and	for	British	public	opinion
more	generally.	Of	the	two	audiences,	the	Conservative	Party	is	perhaps	easier	to	gauge	in	its	likely	reaction.
Image	by	Thomas
Nugent,	(Wikipedia),	licenced	under	CC	Attribution-Share	Alike	2.0	Generic.
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How	British	public	opinion	more	generally	would	react	to	the	prospect	of	leaving	without	an	agreement	is	more
difficult	to	predict.	During	the	referendum	campaign	those	favouring	Brexit	fell	consistently	into	two	camps:	one
saying	leaving	would	involve	no	significant	economic	cost	to	the	UK;	and	another	accepting	potential	economic
disadvantage	but	prepared	to	accept	this	risk	in	order	to	restrict	free	movement,	escape	the	jurisdiction	of	the
European	Court	of	Justice	or	end	payments	into	the	EU	budget.
Given	the	increased	vigour	with	which	British	business	and	financial	interests	are	now	warning	that	a	“cliff-edge
Brexit”	would	be	damaging	to	economic	well-being,	it	is	difficult	to	believe	that	such	a	prospect	would	be	a	matter
of	indifference	to	the	first	of	those	two	camps.	Until	now,	the	Conservative	government	has	been	able	to	keep	in
some	sort	of	harmony	these	two	sorts	of	Brexit	supporter.	If	and	when	it	becomes	clear	that	there	is	no	“good
deal”	on	offer,	that	we	cannot	have	our	cake	and	eat	it,	that	Brexit	is	far	from	a	cost-free	option,	all	the	reasonable
expectation	must	be	that	it	will	change	at	least	some	minds	among	the	wider	British	public.
To	what	extent	and	how	quickly	this	will	occur	is	difficult	to	predict.	It	is	certainly	true	that	for	Brexit	to	become
politically	preventable	a	greater	shift	in	British	public	opinion	than	has	occurred	so	far	would	need	to	be	apparent
over	a	significant	period	of	time	to	decision-makers	in	Westminster.The	past	six	months	of	internal	debate	within
the	Conservative	Party	have	established	an	important	dividing	line	between	those	who	wish	after	Brexit	to	remain
closely	involved	and	aligned	with	the	EU	and	those	who	do	not.	The	first	camp	regards	with	horror	the	prospect	of
a	non-consensual	Brexit	and	would	cheerfully	embrace	a	lengthy	transitional	phase	so	as	to	soften	and	postpone
the	pain	of	parting.	The	second	camp	is	eager	to	leave	the	Union	as	soon	as	possible	and	is	either	indifferent	to
or	even	welcoming	of	an	abrupt	termination	to	the	Brexit	negotiations.	The	prolongation	of	the	present	stalemate
in	negotiations	after	December	would	undoubtedly	be	seized	upon	by	this	camp	as	proof	positive	of	European
unreasonableness	and	intransigence.	Pressure	upon	May	would	inevitably	grow	for	the	hardest	of	hard	Brexits.
there	is	no	“good	deal”	on	offer,	we	cannot	have	our	cake	and	eat	it,	Brexit	is	far
from	a	cost-free	option
Within	the	Conservative	parliamentary	party	a	significant	body	of	opinion	would	simply	ignore	any	changes	in
public	opinion	away	from	support	for	Brexit.	The	2016	referendum,	with	its	lofty	talk	of	“popular	sovereignty”	was
for	them	simply	a	manoeuvre	to	achieve	British	withdrawal	from	the	EU,	a	goal	they	knew	they	could	never
achieve	by	parliamentary	means.	Having	won	the	referendum,	they	have	no	intention	whatsoever	of	being
deprived	of	the	fruit	of	their	victory.
Equally,	within	the	Conservative	parliamentary	party,	there	is	another,	probably	smaller	minority	of	those	who	are
unreconciled	to	Brexit	and	will	use	almost	any	perceived	shift	in	public	opinion	as	the	occasion	for	making	more
explicit	their	unease	about	the	entire	process.	To	render	matters	yet	more	complicated,	there	is	the	central
majority	of	the	Conservative	parliamentary	party	which	regrets	the	prospect	of	Brexit	but	will	not	be	prepared	to
say	so	publicly	until	it	is	politically	safer	to	do	so.
It	is	a	familiar	and	justified	criticism	of	the	Conservatives	that	they	put	party	interests	above	those	of	the	country
on	the	European	issue.	This	criticism	is	particularly	applicable	to	those	like	Ken	Clarke	who	claim	to	understand
the	central	importance	of	the	EU	to	British	political	and	economic	stability,	but	have	acquiesced	in	the	Eurosceptic
annexation	of	their	party.	A	dramatic	change	of	British	public	opinion	on	European	policy	over	the	coming	months
might,	however,	give	this	silent	majority	among	Conservative	MPs	the	political	cover	they	think	they	need	to
become	more	outspoken.
It	is	inevitable	that	political	analysis	and	commentary	should	focus	in	the	first	instance	on	the	Conservative	Party.
This	focus	has	been	encouraged	by	the	studied	ambiguity	of	the	Labour	Party,	led	by	a	long-term	EU	opponent
and	shocked	by	the	number	of	traditional	Labour	voters,	particularly	in	the	north	of	England,	who	voted	for	Brexit.
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Until	now	Jeremy	Corbyn	and	the	dissident	voters	of	Sunderland	have	sufficed	to	mute	Labour’s	opposition	to	the
Conservative	Party’s	ill-thought-out	plans	for	Brexit.	There	is,	however,	reason	to	suppose	that	gradually	this
apprehensive	discretion	may	be	abating.	Sir	Keir	Starmer	seems	gradually	to	be	edging	his	party	towards
rejecting	the	only	kind	of	Brexit	likely	to	be	on	offer,	a	chaotic,	non-consensual	affair	which	it	will	be	easy	to	claim
no	elector	voted	for	last	year.	Changes	in	public	opinion	provoked	by	fear	of	the	Brexit	“cliff-edge”	will	be	as
welcome	to	Sir	Keir	and	his	colleagues	as	they	will	to	their	discreet	equivalents	in	the	Conservative	party.	The
spectacle	of	two-thirds	of	British	MPs	awaiting	permission	from	the	opinion	polls	to	articulate	their	views	on	Brexit
is	an	unedifying	one,	but	it	is	the	distasteful	reality.
It	would	be	a	bold	person	who	would	predict	with	certainty	whether	Brexit	will	occur	on	its	appointed	date	in
March	2019.	Much	has	been	made	of	issues	relating	to	the	revocability	or	otherwise	of	the	Article	50	notification,
to	the	desirability	or	otherwise	of	a	second	British	referendum	on	the	terms	of	Brexit	and	to	possible
reconfiguration	of	the	British	party	political	system.	Whether	Brexit	occurs	or	not	resolves	itself	in	the	last	analysis
into	a	simple	question.	As	the	negative	consequences	of	Brexit	unfold	and	become	more	manifest,	will	there	be
enough	MPs	from	a	range	of	parties	with	the	courage	and	conviction	to	stop	it?
So	far,	this	is	emphatically	not	the	case.	Despite	its	spectacular	incompetence	and	bad	faith,	the	present
Conservative	government	still	determines	the	Brexit	discussion	in	the	UK.	It	is	however	entirely	possible	that
changing	public	opinion	will	interact	over	the	coming	months	with	latent	(and	not	so	latent)	concerns	among	many
MPs	to	produce	a	substantial	majority	hostile	to	the	only	kind	of	Brexit	which	can	realistically	be	achieved.	If	that
is	so,	questions	about	the	revocation	of	Article	50,	a	second	referendum	and	new	political	parties	will	fall	into	their
as	yet	unpredictable	place.	It	would	be	a	stupendous	but	entirely	conceivable	irony	if	next	year’s	robust	assertion
of	British	Parliamentary	sovereignty	was	not	to	embrace	Brexit	as	a	resumption	of	“control”	but	rather	roundly	to
reject	the	whole	Brexit	chimaera.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	An	earlier	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	our	sister	site,	LSE	Brexit.	The	article
gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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